Selfish routing is one of the fundamental models in the study of network traffic systems. While most literature assumes essentially static flows, game theoretical models of dynamic flows began to draw attention recently [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] .
entering the system are independent of the decisions of the agents who are currently in the system. In game-theoretic terminology, while the dynamic traffic problem is usually modeled as a game of normal form (or a simultaneous-move game), we model it as a game of extensive form, which allows for agents' online adjustments and error corrections.
Let Γ denote our extensive-form game of dynamic traffic, for which we apply the solution concept of (pure strategy) Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE). We demonstrate in a constructive way that Γ always possesses a very special SPE. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first SPE existence result in this field.
Then we study a very natural subset of SPEs of Γ, which is shown to possess desirable properties that are intuitively reasonable but technically hard to verify. This subset corresponds to the simplified setting, denoted as Γ n , where agents choose their one-off o-d paths simultaneously at the very start of the game. The SPE existence of Γ implies that Γ n admits at least one (pure strategy) Nash Equilibrium (NE). We show that the set of NEs of game Γ n forms a proper subset of the realized path profiles of the SPEs of game Γ. Furthermore, we prove that in Γ n every NE is also a strong NE and hence weakly Pareto optimal, and establish many other nice properties of all NE flows, including global (valid throughout the network) First-In-First-Out, hierarchal independence, and so on. These properties remain valid even if the network has multiple origins and a single destination. This is one of the key reasons that we are able to prove the existence of an SPE for Γ and the relationship between Γ and Γ n (note that the off-equilibrium scenarios in Γ are essentially new problems with multiple origins).
Since there may be infinitely many agents in models like ours, a natural question is whether the queue length at each edge at equilibria can be bounded by a constant that depends only on the input finite network, when the inflow size never exceeds the minimum capacity of o-d cuts in the network. This interesting yet theoretically challenging issue has been listed as one of the important open problems in the literature [1, 4] . We prove that equilibrium queue lengths are indeed bounded in our games on two classes of networks: Γ n on series-parallel networks, and Γ on networks in which the in-degree does not exceed the out-degree at any nonterminal vertex.
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